Official language from Moscow and Beijing describes a relationship at a historic high. The useful question for businesses and analysts is how far that political closeness translates into economic and strategic integration, and where the limits are. This analysis looks at what the two governments themselves say and what their trade and energy figures show.
What the two sides say
During Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow in May 2025, Vladimir Putin described relations as having “reached the highest level in history” and said the two leaders had signed a joint statement setting goals for trade and investment by 2030 (Kremlin).
Beijing frames the partnership carefully. Asked in February 2025 whether a thaw between Moscow and Washington could affect ties, China’s foreign ministry said cooperation with Russia “does not target any third party” and that China would stay committed to “non-alliance, non-confrontation” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs). That is the language of a strategic partnership, not a formal alliance.
What the trade data show
- 2024: bilateral trade set a record of $245 billion, according to the Kremlin (Kremlin).
- 2025: citing China’s customs administration, the Russian embassy in Beijing reported trade of $228.1 billion, down 6.9%. Russian exports to China fell 3.9% to $124.8 billion and imports from China fell 10.4% to $103.3 billion (Russian Embassy in China).
The decline does not signal a break, since trade remains well above the $200 billion target the leaders had set, but it shows that political goodwill does not by itself guarantee growth.
Payments and energy
- Currencies. Putin said in May 2025 that “nearly all” Russian-Chinese trade transactions are now settled in rubles and yuan (Kremlin). For third-country companies, that means less trade running through dollar and euro channels.
- Gas. In September 2025 Gazprom’s chief executive, Alexei Miller, told reporters that a “legally binding memorandum” had been signed on building the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline and the Soyuz Vostok transit line through Mongolia, which he said would allow 50 billion cubic metres of gas a year to be supplied (as reported by TASS and republished by Russia’s Ministry of Transport). A memorandum is a step towards a contract, not a contract; the commercial terms that would decide the project’s economics have not been published.
Where alignment is strong, and where it is limited
| Area | Evidence of alignment | Evidence of limits |
|---|---|---|
| Political messaging | “Highest level in history” (Kremlin) | Beijing stresses “non-alliance” |
| Trade | Above the $200bn target | Fell 6.9% in 2025; Chinese exports fell faster |
| Finance | Settlement almost entirely in rubles and yuan | Shows dependence on workarounds as much as integration |
| Energy | Power of Siberia 2 memorandum | No published price or final contract |
Table: BusinessCraft assessment based on the sources linked in this article.
What it means for businesses
The relationship is best read as a deep but asymmetric partnership: politically close, economically significant and still bounded by each side’s own interests. Companies exposed to either market should watch three indicators: monthly customs data, whether Power of Siberia 2 moves from memorandum to binding supply contract, and any change in Beijing’s “non-alliance” wording.
Key figures
| Figure | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Russia–China trade, 2024 | $245bn (record) | Kremlin |
| Russia–China trade, 2025 | $228.1bn (−6.9%) | Russian Embassy in China (GACC data) |
| Russian exports to China, 2025 | $124.8bn (−3.9%) | Russian Embassy in China (GACC data) |
| Russian imports from China, 2025 | $103.3bn (−10.4%) | Russian Embassy in China (GACC data) |
| Power of Siberia 2 stated capacity | 50 bcm per year | Russian Ministry of Transport (republishing TASS), 2 Sep 2025 |
Figures as published by the linked sources; table compiled by BusinessCraft.
Related reading
- Armed Conflict by the Numbers: What 2025 Data Signals for Business in 2026
- The Northern Sea Route in Numbers: A Seasonal Niche, Not a Suez Replacement
- Shipping’s Redrawn Map: Detours, Recoveries and What Route Changes Mean for Trade
This article is general information and analysis, not investment advice.
Sources
- Kremlin: Media statements by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping (8 May 2025)
- Embassy of the Russian Federation in China: On Russian-Chinese trade in 2025 (15 Jan 2026, citing China’s General Administration of Customs; Russian)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC: Regular press conference, 14 Feb 2025
- Russian Ministry of Transport (republishing TASS), 2 Sep 2025




