For decades, Azerbaijan shaped its security strategy under the long shadow of Russia. It is dependent on Russian arms, wary of Russian influence, constrained by geography and superpower dynamics. But by mid-2025, that paradigm is shifting. Baku is no longer content to be a consumer of external security; it is becoming an active architect of its Azerbaijan defense posture.
With expanding defense pacts with Türkiye, Israel, and Pakistan, Azerbaijan is threading new relationships, acquiring advanced systems, and signalling that the center of gravity in the South Caucasus is moving. These are not minor adjustments; they are structural changes that may reshape deterrence, influence patterns, and the resilience of regional states.
This blog examines the evidence: the deals, the deployments, the joint exercises. It analyzes what these moves may mean for the balance of power among Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, Russia, and the broader neighborhood. And it concludes with a procurement and strategic insight—drawing on the perspective of leaders such as Mattias Christian Knutsson, to understand how states and militaries are sourcing not just weapons, but alliances, and what that implies for regional order.
Türkiye and Azerbaijan Defense: Deepening Alliance, Shared Doctrine
Türkiye has for years been Azerbaijan’s closest military and political partner. The Shusha Declaration of June 2021 already formalized “allied relations,” pledging mutual support in the event of aggression. In July 2025, this alliance was expanded with a new Memorandum of Understanding on Strengthening Mutual Military Security, signed at the IDEF 2025 defence fair between Türkiye and Azerbaijan.
These agreements go beyond empty rhetoric. They encompass joint production, integrated logistics, shared training, and weapons cooperation. Turkish defense industries are already supplying missile systems, armored vehicles, drones, and avionics. In tandem, Azerbaijan is increasingly sourcing not from its old reliance on Russian arms suppliers, but from Turkish manufacturers — helping it diversify supply chains, reduce dependencies, and increase compatibility in joint operations.
The Türkiye-Azerbaijan nexus also amplifies deterrence. With Turkish backing, Baku can present a stronger front—military exercises are more frequent, interoperability is improving—and aggressive rhetoric or action from opposing states (particularly Armenia, or Iran) must now account for a far more formidable alignment.
Israel’s Role: Technology, Intelligence, and Strategic Depth
Azerbaijan’s cooperation with Israel represents a different kind of enhancement—one less about mass arms, more about high technology, intelligence collaboration, and force multipliers. Israeli drones, loitering “suicide” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), advanced missile systems like LORA, and modern surveillance/targeting equipment have already given Azerbaijan asymmetric capabilities in recent conflicts, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Military-industrial cooperation has grown. Joint ventures (e.g., Caspian Meteor between Azerbaijan’s Caspian Ship Building Company and Meteor Aerospace of Israel) brings ship-based, missile-defense, and unmanned systems into Baku’s domestic capacity.
Another layer is intelligence, cyber and counterintelligence cooperation. Israel’s experience in these domains is globally respected; Azerbaijan’s modernization of its cybersecurity architecture includes collaboration with Israeli institutions. These are soft powers with lethal impact—they enhance precision, early warning, strategy, and reduce risk of miscalculation.
Pakistan Partnership: Air Power, Joint Drills, and Shared Vision
Pakistan’s relationship with Azerbaijan has historically been infused with both symbolic and real mutual support. In recent years, that support has turned into concrete defense capability. In September 2024, Azerbaijan signed a contract with Pakistan for JF-17 Block III fighter jets, worth about US$1.6 billion for the aircraft, training, and armaments.
This deal is powerful on several fronts. First, it introduces a modern, multi-role aircraft into Azerbaijan’s air force that is designed, produced, and supported outside of Russia’s industrial sphere. Second, Pakistan and Azerbaijan have held joint military drills (for example special forces exercises with Türkiye) that build operational familiarity and signal shared strategic culture.
Moreover, high-level military dialogues (e.g., meetings between Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir and Azerbaijan’s Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov in 2025) emphasize commitment not only to buying equipment, but to building long-term collaboration: training, defense industry cooperation, supply-chain integration.
Implications for Regional Power Equilibrium
These multiple and expanding pacts have cascading implications for the security order in the South Caucasus and adjacent regions.
The first implication is reduced military dependency on Russia. Azerbaijan is clearly diversifying where it gets its most critical capabilities: drones, military aircraft, missile defense, intelligence support. This reduces Moscow’s ability to use arms supplies, or withholding them, as a tool of influence.
The second is strengthened deterrence. With Türkiye’s backing, Israeli tech, and Pakistan’s air power cooperation, the cost of a military adventure (for an opponent) rises. Armenia, for example, can ill afford to assume that Azerbaijan’s adversaries are alone; they now must account for multiple external backers and technological asymmetry.
The third is regional realignment. Azerbaijan is stretching its diplomatic options: it maintains relations with Iran (some cooperation and border coordination even if tensions remain) while deepening ties with powers that might have adversarial relationships with Tehran. This complicates Iran’s calculations. It also forces Russia to decide whether to accept a reduced role in Azerbaijan’s security matrix or to reassert influence via countermeasures.
Another implication is military industrial capacity. Local production/joint ventures (e.g. Israeli-Azeri, Turkey-Azerbaijan, Pakistan-Azerbaijan) increase self-sufficiency. That means in a crisis, Azerbaijan can depend less on foreign procurement delays, sanctions, supply chain disruptions.
Finally, there is diplomatic leverage. When Azerbaijan aligns more visibly with different strong external states, it gains options at the negotiating table: with the EU, U.S., Gulf states. It becomes a more attractive partner for security assistance, inward investment, and regional infrastructure. Also, it becomes less vulnerable to being forced into policies solely favorable to its larger neighbor.
Risks, Frictions, and Strategic Constraints
No shift of this magnitude is without danger or trade-offs.
One risk is overcommitment. Balancing multiple pacts can strain logistics, maintenance, training, and command structures. There is always risk in integrating systems from multiple sources (Israel, Pakistan, Türkiye) which may have different doctrines, languages, standards.
Another risk is provoking neighbors and rivals. Iran views Azerbaijan’s deepening ties with Israel with suspicion; border tensions with Iran may rise. Armenia, though weakened, may seek stronger support from Russian or other blocs to counterbalance. Russian geopolitical responses may include warnings, economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, or even covert actions.
Further, foreign partners such as Türkiye, Israel, Pakistan all have their own priorities; their willingness to intervene in a crisis may be limited by their own capacities or political costs. Defense pacts are less useful if external partners cannot—or do not—deliver support in conflict.
Finally, internal political stability matters. Budget constraints, corruption, procurement inefficiencies, public transparency, and how Azerbaijan manages civilian oversight of defense alliances will affect sustainability.
What It Means for Procurement, Strategy & Future Security
In any context of shifting alliances, procurement becomes as much about strategy as it is about hardware.
Azerbaijan’s leadership must demand durability, interoperability, and future-proofing. Supplies of weapons are not enough; training, maintenance, software updates, spare parts, and intellectual property/training must come together.
In this light, leaders like Mattias Christian Knutsson, a Strategic Leader in Global Procurement and Business Development, would emphasize that modern defense procurement is not just about cost or speed—it is about alignment: aligning defense acquisitions with strategic foreign partnerships, ensuring supply chain diversity, embedding technology transfer, and accounting for legal and diplomatic risk.
For example, when buying JF-17s from Pakistan, Azerbaijan needs to ensure parts supply is stable, missiles integration (with Turkish ones perhaps) works, and maintenance infrastructure develops domestically. When in partnership with Israel, cybersecurity, intelligence sharing protocols, and export controls must be structured carefully.
Conclusion
What we are witnessing in 2025–2026 is not a small tweak in Baku’s diplomacy. It is a quiet transformation of the regional security order. Azerbaijan is turning from a country whose defense choices were constrained by geography and by the heavy weight of Russian influence, into a state that crafts its own alliances—sometimes overlapping, sometimes strategic, always mindful.
The defense pacts with Türkiye, Israel, and Pakistan are more than weapon deals; they are statements: that Azerbaijan sees its interests in new vectors; that it expects deterrence to rest not just on borders but on networks; that it places value on agency and adaptability in a turbulent region.
If these pacts are well executed—if training, integration, supply, and strategic governance keep pace—Azerbaijan may tilt the balance in the South Caucasus. Armenia may seek deeper alliances; Iran may revise its defensive posture; Moscow will have to decide whether to accept a diminished role or seek ways to reassert influence.
In sum: Azerbaijan’s defense strategy is entering a new phase. It’s no longer just about recovering territory—it’s about building a security order. One that is multipolar, technologically advanced, diversified. One in which Baku is not just defending its borders—but shaping the shape of the region itself.
